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When Apple launched the iPad in 2010, its then CEO Steve Jobs was
quizzed on camera about the price of e-Books to be sold through the device’s
iBooks application. Why would someone buy a book from Apple for $14.99 if
the same book was offered for $9.99 by Amazon? Steve Jobs’s response:
“Well, that won’t be the case . . . . The prices will be the same.”1
How could he be so sure? It emerged that this was specified in a contractual
condition between Apple and the book publishers, a form of Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause requiring that the publishers price their e-Books no
higher on Apple’s iBook platform than they were priced on other online plat-
forms. These clauses form a key component of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice’s action against Apple and several publishers, which has recently been
successful on appeal to the Second Circuit.2 In commitments signed with the
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European Commission in order to terminate its own e-Books case, Apple has
also agreed to remove these terms from its contracts in the European Union.3
Such “Retail Price MFN clauses” can be distinguished from the more stan-
dard wholesale price MFN clauses and seem to be a relatively new phenome-
non, at least within the experience of antitrust authorities. Since these clauses
arise primarily in the context of online retail platforms, they are also some-
times known as “platform MFNs” or “platform parities.” The essence of the
restriction involved is clear from the Apple e-Books case. In a context where it
is the supplier, rather than the retailer, that sets final retail prices,4 a Retail
Price MFN clause requires the supplier not to set retail prices any higher than
the corresponding prices for that supplier’s goods when offered through, or
by, any other retailer.5
Major Internet retailer Amazon dropped a similar “price parity” condition
across Europe in the face of antitrust concerns.6 The clause in question lay
within Amazon’s standard contract for traders selling through the company’s
online retail platform, Amazon Marketplace. It prohibited a trader from sell-
ing a product for a lower price, including the delivery charge, on its own
website or on another retail platform such as eBay or play.com. Amazon
stated this rule was “critical to preserve fairness for Amazon customers” who
expect to find low prices on Amazon Marketplace. The UK and German com-
petition authorities, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Bundeskartellamt,
were not persuaded. They closed their investigations into the clause only after
Amazon dropped it.7
3 Case COMP/AT.39847—E-Books, Comm’n Decision, 2012 O.J. (C 9288). The e-Books
MFN story is not over. In the European Union, recent reports suggest that DG Comp is looking
again at the issue of MFNs in the e-Books market, this time regarding Amazon’s MFN clauses
with smaller publishers. See Joe Miller, Amazon Accused of “Bullying” Smaller UK Publishers,
BBC NEWS (June 26, 2014); EU: Amazon eBook Deal Complaints Spread, CPI: COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L, EUROPE COLUMN (June 30, 2014).
4 Strictly, suppliers may set fixed or minimum retail prices.
5 While the restriction here is framed purely in terms of price, it should be noted that such
clauses may also contain similar restrictions related to conditions of sale or product availability,
possibly to counter obvious avoidance tactics that suppliers might otherwise employ. In this
article, we focus purely on restrictions around retail prices. However, such non-price restrictions
may be similar, or even identical, in effect as the price restrictions discussed here and thus many
of the same points are likely to apply.
6 Matthew Ogborne, Amazon Gets Aggressive with Price Parity, THE LAST DROP OF INK
(Feb. 16, 2012), lastdropofink.co.uk/market-places/amazon/amazon-gets-aggressive-with-price-
parity/.
7 See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Welcomes Amazon’s Decision to End Price
Parity Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://
www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/60-13; Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Amazon
Abandons Price Parity Clauses for Good (Nov. 26, 2013), www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs
/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/26_11_2013_Amazon-Verfahrenseinstellung.html.
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Interest in such clauses does not stop there. A number of European national
competition authorities have taken action against such clauses in the context
of online hotel booking platforms. In 2013, the Bundeskartellamt issued an
infringement decision against HRS, an online booking portal in Germany, re-
quiring it to delete its “best price” clauses.8 In the United Kingdom, the OFT
accepted commitments from online travel agents Expedia and Booking.com in
2014 to alter their contracts to allow (limited) discounting of hotel rooms by
rival platforms.9
While the OFT’s case against Expedia and Booking.com was formally
framed as a retail price maintenance (RPM) case in respect of their agree-
ments with hotels,10 it was motivated by a complaint by the small online travel
agency Skoosh about MFN agreements between the larger online travel agents
and hotels.11 Skoosh complained that these agreements prevented it from of-
fering additional discounts on hotel rooms sold through its website, which it
would have funded by reducing its own commission.12 Skoosh claimed that
the clause acted as a barrier to entry and harmed Skoosh’s ability to build a
presence in the market, to the detriment of competition and customers.13
More recently, and with an unprecedented level of inter-authority coordina-
tion, the competition authorities in France, Italy, and Sweden announced that
they had accepted identical commitments from Booking.com in relation to its
MFN clauses.14 The concern in these later cases appears to be less about the
effect of such clauses in restricting entry (by players like Skoosh) and more
8 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Online Hotel Portal HRS’s “Best Price” Clause Vio-
lates Competition Law—Proceedings Also Initiated Against Other Hotel Portals (Dec. 20, 2013),
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/20_12_2013_HRS
.html.
9 Office of Fair Trading, Hotel Online Booking: Decision to Accept Commitments to Re-
move Certain Discounting Restrictions for Online Travel Agents (Jan. 31, 2014), webarchive.na
tionalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca-and-cartels/oft1514
dec.pdf.
10 Id. ¶¶ 5.1–5.3.
11 Simon Gompertz, OFT Launches Investigation into Online Hotel Room Sales, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 16, 2010), www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11330463.
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Dorian Harris, Open Letter to William Baer, Arnold & Porter LLP, DORIAN’S
BLOG (Aug. 8, 2012), dorian.skoosh.com/open-letter-to-william-baer-arnold-porter-llp. The UK
Competition Appeal Tribunal quashed the OFT’s 2014 decision on procedural grounds and re-
mitted it for reconsideration by the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The CMA
has not yet made a revised decision. Skyscanner Ltd. v. Competition & Markets Auth., [2014]
CAT 16, No. 1226/2/12/14, www.catribunal.org.uk/238-8651/Judgment.html.
14 See Press Release, Autorita` Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Commitments Of-
fered by Booking.com: Closed the Investigation in Italy, France and Sweden (Apr. 21 2015),
www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2207-i779-commitments-offered-by-bookingcom-
closed-the-investigation-in-italy-france-and-sweden.html. Proceedings were also commenced
against another hotel booking platform, Expedia.com. These proceedings are ongoing.
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about their impact in limiting competition between platforms in terms of the
commissions they charge.15
An important difference between the commitments taken in France, Italy,
and Sweden and those in earlier German and UK cases is that the later cases
distinguish “Broad” Retail Price MFNs from “Narrow” Retail Price MFNs,
and only prohibit the former. Broad Retail Price MFNs require the suppliers
to set prices for the retailer (or retail platform) in question that are no higher
than those the supplier sets—or observes—through any other channel, includ-
ing both competitor retailers or platforms and the supplier’s own vertically
integrated websites.16 Narrow Retail Price MFNs require the supplier to set
prices for the retailer (or retail platform) in question that are no higher than
those the supplier offers through its own vertically integrated websites.
An earlier case, the market investigation by the UK Competition and Mar-
kets Authority (CMA) into private motor insurance, also highlights this dis-
tinction between Broad and Narrow Retail Price MFNs. The CMA banned
Broad Retail Price MFNs in the context of private motor insurance sold
through online price comparison websites (PCWs).17 However, the CMA al-
lowed the continued use of Narrow Retail Price MFNs, primarily on the basis
that these are far less likely to have substantial competitive impact in the
whole market. Because Broad Retail Price MFNs restrict a supplier’s pricing
choices across the market, they have the potential to impact competition mar-
ket-wide. By contrast, Narrow Retail Price MFNs only restrict a supplier’s
pricing on its own websites, and will not have any impact on competition
between platforms (or PCWs). As such, so long as there is sufficient competi-
tion across platforms (or PCWs) in the market, the overall impact of the nar-
row variant of the clause is likely to be far more limited than that of the broad
15 The press release states that “by limiting significantly the scope of MFN clauses, OTAs
(online travel agents) will be able to more effectively compete on the level of the commissions
applied to hotels.” Id.
16 While most of the cases discussed above relate to markets where suppliers set prices across
all retailers or platforms themselves, this is not necessary for a Broad Retail Price MFN clause to
have an effect. These clauses can also be effective in a market with mixed business formats. If
prices through other retailers or platforms are set independently, then the effect of the Broad
Retail Price MFN clause is to require the supplier to match the best price, offered by any other
retailer or platform. This possibility is considered by Foros, Kind, and Shaffer and discussed in
Part II.C below. See Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, Turning the Page on
Business Formats for Digital Platforms: Does Apple’s Agency Model Soften Competition? (Ctr.
for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst., Working Paper No. 4362, Aug. 2013), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2317715.
17 See COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., PRIVATE MOTOR INSURANCE MARKET INVESTIGATION:
FINAL REPORT (Sept. 24, 2014). PCWs are a form of online retail platform.
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variant.18 For this reason, this article focuses on Broad Retail Price MFN
clauses.
These clauses have started to concern competition agencies. A recent report
by the International Competition Network (ICN) finds that around 80 percent
of responding competition authorities indicate that the online use of RPM and
price relationship agreements was either of concern or of increasing
prevalence.19
So why do these clauses create such concern and how should they be
treated within antitrust law? This article addresses these two important ques-
tions through a series of steps. First, we review the existing economic litera-
ture relating to these clauses. We find that the literature is new and still
developing, but nevertheless useful. We review the key intuitions underlying
findings from modeling work by Andre Boik and Kenneth S. Corts, and by
Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, and Greg Shaffer.20 This work identifies three
potential anticompetitive effects arising from Broad Retail Price MFN
clauses: (1) they may soften competition between retailers on the margin
charged to suppliers; (2) they may restrict entry at the retailer level; and (3) in
a market with asymmetric business formats where suppliers set some retail
prices but other retailers set their own prices, the clauses may eliminate price
competition at the retail level such that prices are set as if there were RPM
across all retailers.
Second, we note that there is a close relationship between Broad Retail
Price MFN clauses and more standard (fixed and minimum) RPM, on which
there is a wider and more established economic literature and body of case
law.21 This relationship may inform and further develop our understanding of
18 This rationale is set out clearly in the UK CMA market investigation into private motor
insurance (PMI), which finds that “narrow MFN clauses between PCWs and PMI providers are
unlikely to have the same impact on competition because they maintain the possibility of premi-
ums varying on different PCWs. We recognised that narrow MFNs reduced the constraint on
PCWs imposed by the PMI provider’s own website, but found that the constraint PMI providers’
own websites imposed on PCWs was small compared with the constraint from other PCWs.
Overall, we found that if there were any anticompetitive effects from narrow MFNs, they were
unlikely to be significant in the context of PMI.” Id. ¶ 60.
19 AUSTRL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ONLINE
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS SPECIAL PROJECT REPORT 9 tbl. 1 (2015) (4% of respondents said that
RPM “[i]s one of our top priorities,” 49% said that RPM “[i]s of concern,” and 34% said that
RPM “[i]s not yet prevalent enough to be of concern but is increasing in prevalence;” responses
for price relationship were 4%, 43%, and 38%, respectively).
20 Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, The Effects of Platform MFNs on Competition and Entry
(June 3, 2014) (unpublished), editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=
RES2015&paper_id=41; Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16.
21 Henceforth, any reference to RPM should be taken to relate to “fixed and/or minimum
RPM” unless it is clearly stated otherwise. Maximum RPM is not relevant here. It raises far
fewer concerns from an economics perspective and is treated differently under European law.
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the economics of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses. We note that standard
RPM effectively involves two distinct elements. There is the vertical element,
whereby a supplier sets final retail prices. This is the inherent and explicit
element of RPM. In principle, pure RPM involves only this vertical element.
However, in practice, within both the economic literature and industry prac-
tice, RPM typically (if implicitly) also involves a horizontal element, whereby
the supplier sets identical retail prices across all retailers (or retail platforms).
It is this horizontal element that is closely related to Broad Retail Price MFN
clauses. Absent Broad Retail Price MFN clauses, the RPM in the cases de-
scribed above would have been purely vertical. Suppliers would have had the
freedom to set different prices across different retail platforms. Broad Retail
Price MFNs ensure that prices are identical across retail platforms, just as
under the horizontal element of RPM.
This close similarity between Broad Retail Price MFNs and the horizontal
element of standard RPM means that we can learn more about the former
from the established economic literature on the latter. Much of this literature
effectively combines both vertical and horizontal elements of RPM, as does
much of the existing case law. The elements are, however, conceptually sepa-
rate, and once we separate them out, it becomes clear that the horizontal ele-
ment is at the heart of the more serious antitrust concerns relating to RPM.
The vertical element is, on its own, of far less concern.
Our analysis of the RPM literature shows that, in addition to the adverse
effects on competition identified in the existing literature on Broad Retail
Price MFNs, these latter restrictions may produce a number of additional an-
ticompetitive effects including (1) facilitating downstream collusion, (2) facil-
itating upstream collusion, (3) acting as a commitment device to protect
monopoly rents upstream, and (4) restricting entry or expansion upstream.
Finally, we consider how Broad Retail Price MFNs should be treated within
antitrust law. On the basis of our analysis of the RPM literature and case law,
we find that many of the most serious antitrust concerns arising from RPM
relate to its horizontal element. Given their similarity with this horizontal ele-
ment of RPM, we argue that Broad Retail Price MFN clauses are equivalent to
“RPM at its worst.”
We recognize that there is an ongoing policy debate about the appropriate
legal treatment of RPM. Some jurisdictions—most notably the United States
and Canada—have moved away from per se prohibition. Others—most nota-
bly the European Union and some U.S. states—continue to treat RPM as a
hardcore infringement.22 It is beyond the scope of this article to opine on
22 Ironically, one of the few exceptions to the EU ban on RPM is for books, where some
Member States still either permit or mandate RPM, some even in the case of e-Books. See Joost
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where to draw the policy line on RPM. Our aim instead is to provide a com-
parative analysis of RPM and Broad Retail Price MFNs, with a view to ensure
policy coherence.
This analysis suggests that a consistent legal approach would apply the
same scrutiny to Broad Retail Price MFNs as to RPM. Within current Euro-
pean law, RPM is seen under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TEFU) as a hardcore restriction, or a restriction of com-
petition “by object.” This essentially means it can be presumed harmful with-
out the authority needing to demonstrate any anticompetitive effect. The
burden of proof is on the alleged infringers to demonstrate that the RPM has
efficiency benefits that satisfy the conditions in Article 101(3) TFEU.23 A
consistent approach in Europe would therefore also treat Broad Retail Price
MFNs as hardcore restrictions, or restrictions of competition by object.
I. BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFN CLAUSES DEFINED
In a standard retail model, suppliers do not set final retail prices. Rather,
they sell their products or services at wholesale prices to a downstream re-
tailer and leave it up to the retailer to set final retail prices. The retailer is
remunerated for its services by the difference between retail and wholesale
prices. In some situations, however, suppliers set final retail prices and then
pay the retailer directly for its services. This is a standard business model for
online retail platforms, such as eBay or Amazon Marketplace, and for PCWs.
It can also occur in an offline environment where suppliers sell through down-
stream agents, or more generally where suppliers engage in RPM.
Where suppliers set final retail prices, Broad Retail Price MFN clauses can
restrict suppliers’ pricing freedom. Absent such clauses, suppliers would—in
principle at least—be free to set different retail prices across different retailers
or retail platforms. Such clauses require suppliers to set prices for the retailer
or retail platform that are no less generous to consumers than those the sup-
plier sets—or observes—through any other sales channel.
Perhaps surprisingly, a Broad Retail Price MFN clause can look attractive
from a consumer’s perspective, as they often take the form of a “best price
promise,” whereby a retailer or platform promises that consumers will not
find cheaper prices anywhere else in the market. Some online platforms in-
volved in the cases described above have made claims of exactly this sort.
Poort & Nico van Eijk, Digital Fixation: The Law and Economics of a Fixed e-Book Price, INT’L
J. CULTURAL POL’Y (published online July 9, 2015).
23 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101(3),
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
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Best price promises are often offered unilaterally by retailers.24 While con-
sumers may view them favorably, such promises can raise competition con-
cerns in their own right (although these are not addressed here).25
In the case of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses, however, there is an addi-
tional element. A retailer or retail platform does not offer the best price prom-
ise unilaterally. It is enforced via explicit agreement with a third party, the
upstream supplier. In theory, such clauses only specify the existence of a pric-
ing inequality: retail prices set through the retailer that is party to the contract
must be no higher than those offered through other retailers. In practice, how-
ever, suppliers may have reciprocal Broad Retail Price MFN arrangements
with other retailers and retail platforms. In such a case, the combined effect of
24 Consider, for example, the claim offered by one UK department store, John Lewis, that it
will “never knowingly [be] undersold.” See Never Knowingly Undersold, JOHN LEWIS PARTNER-
SHIP, www.johnlewis.com/inspiration-and-advice/never-knowingly-undersold-policy (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
25 Best price promises are alternatively called “lowest price” or “price match” guarantees. See
LEAR, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, CAN “FAIR” PRICES BE UNFAIR: A REVIEW OF PRICE RELATION-
SHIP AGREEMENTS (Sept. 2012) (summarizing literature on best price promises); see also Ralph
A. Winter, Price-Matching and Meeting Competition Guarantees, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1269 (W. Dale Collins ed., 2008). The
link between price promises aimed at rivals’ prices and those aimed at suppliers’ prices has been
explored by Hviid and Shaffer. See Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Matching Own Prices, Rivals’
Prices, or Both, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 479 (2010). A key insight from the “best price promise”
literature is that efficiency benefits relating to price discrimination require prices, at equilibrium,
to vary either within or across retailers. As price matching through the MFN contract is auto-
matic, we can rule this out.
It is noteworthy that Broad Retail Price MFN clauses are formally identical to another type of
price-relativity clause. Under this alternative price-relativity clause, it is retailers that set final
retail prices—as in a standard retail-based system—but are required to set these prices such that
the product covered by the clause is priced no higher than competing products. This is effectively
the same constraint as the Broad Retail Price MFN, but “upside down.” While such clauses have
rarely attracted antitrust scrutiny, they arose in the context of two UK cases. See MONOPOLIES &
MERGERS COMM’N, FOREIGN PACKAGE HOLIDAYS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY IN THE U.K. OF
TOUR OPERATORS’ SERVICES AND TRAVEL AGENTS’ SERVICES IN RELATION TO FOREIGN PACK-
AGE HOLIDAYS, 1997, Cm. 3813, ch. 2, at  6–52; see also id. ch. 5, at  110–46 (discussing market
practices); id. ch. 7, at  173–216 (discussing views of the main parties); Tobacco, [2010] Case
CE/2596-03 (OFT) (UK). Note that the OFT decision has since been overturned. See (1) Imperial
Tobacco Group plc (2) Imperial Tobacco Limited v. OFT, [2011] CAT 41 (UK Competition
Appeal Tribunal).
Broad Retail Price MFN clauses are also equivalent to an upside-down version of the non-
discrimination provisions in American Express’s terms for U.S. merchants, which prohibit
merchants that accept American Express cards from offering discounts or otherwise steering
customers to use cards that are less expensive for the merchants to process. American Express’s
provisions, which were successfully challenged by the U.S. Department of Justice, were recently
upheld on appeal. United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 15-1672, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17502
(2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2016), rev’g 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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these clauses is full pricing equality of the supplier’s products across retailers
and platforms.26
It should be noted that there is nothing within a Broad Retail Price MFN
clause that links the prices of different suppliers, only the prices across differ-
ent retailers for a given supplier’s products. This is true even where there are
reciprocal agreements across different retailers, or where the clauses are
adopted as standard across the industry, as appears to have been the case in
the hotel online booking market. As such, these agreements have no direct
restrictive effect on the relative prices charged across different suppliers.27
II. ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS OF BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFN CLAUSES
The economic literature of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses is new and still
developing. While there have been a number of contributions,28 two articles
(Boik and Corts, and Foros, Kind, and Shaffer) address the key potential an-
ticompetitive effects so far identified.29 First, the clauses can soften competi-
tion between retailers on the fees they charge to suppliers for their retail
services. A retailer with a Broad Retail Price MFN will have an enhanced
incentive to raise its fees to suppliers because it knows that it will not be
26 Suppose a supplier is required to set a price for Retailer A no higher than the price for
Retailer B and also required to set a price in Retailer B no higher than the price in Retailer A.
Both inequality conditions can only be satisfied if prices are identical across the two retailers.
For simplicity, throughout the rest of this article, we will typically refer to upstream suppliers
and downstream retailers. We use the term “retailer” to include online retail platforms as well as
PCWs. In doing so, we recognize that many of the recent and current cases relate to PCWs, and
that there is ongoing debate around whether it is appropriate to view such platforms as down-
stream retailers. The UK hotel online booking case (see supra note 9) was framed as RPM, on
the basis that the hotel online booking platforms were effectively acting as retailers. Some, how-
ever, argue that they should be seen as upstream suppliers of distribution (or marketing or search
services) or alternatively as genuine agents, at least from a competition law perspective. See
Matthew Bennett, Online Platforms: Retailers, Genuine Agents or None of the Above?, CPI:
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, EUROPE COLUMN (June 20, 2013) (discussing economics of online
platforms and the application of genuine agency provisions). In our view, these issues, while of
interest legally, are irrelevant to the economics of these clauses and we lose nothing substantive
in using our simplified terminology.
27 Such agreements may, however, have an indirect effect, as is discussed in Parts IV.B and
IV.C below.
28 See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Restrictions in Multi-sided Platforms:
Practices and Responses, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2014, Vol. 10, No. 2, at 86; Benja-
min Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation, 130 Q.J. ECON.
1283 (2015); Joshua S. Gans, Mobile Application Pricing, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 52 (2012);
Justin P. Johnson, The Agency Model and MFN Clauses (Jan. 10, 2014) (unpublished),
ssrn.com/abstract=2217849.
29 Boik & Corts, supra note 20; Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16. Boik and Corts use the
term “Platform MFNs,” but, as discussed above, their results are not restricted to an online
setting.
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disadvantaged in terms of retail prices relative to other platforms. In equilib-
rium, these higher fees will lead to higher retail prices.
Second, Broad Retail Price MFNs can restrict entry at the retail level. Spe-
cifically, they can disadvantage potential retail competitors with low-end busi-
ness models by eliminating such an entrant’s ability to win customers away
from the incumbent by offering lower prices and earning a smaller margin.
Third, in a market with asymmetric business formats where the supplier
sets prices for some retailers but other retailers set their own prices, Broad
Retail Price MFNs can eliminate price competition at the retail level and lead
to prices being set as if there were RPM across all retailers. In this case, the
supplier does not control all prices charged by retailers for its products, but is
required to monitor and match any retailers that it does not control. This price-
matching commitment can eliminate competition at the retail level by remov-
ing any incentive for the retailer that is potentially able to set its own prices to
undercut its rival. This means that suppliers effectively set prices across all
retailers, even those that formally have retail pricing freedom.
The findings and observations of Boik and Corts and of Foros, Kind, and
Shaffer regarding these effects are discussed in more detail below.
A. BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFN CLAUSES CAN SOFTEN COMPETITION
To understand the softening of competition effect, it is first important to
remember that we are in a market context where suppliers, and not retailers,
set prices, and in which retailers are then paid a commission or fee for their
services. This can be characterized as “effective RPM.”30
Given this context, it is assumed that retailers set their fees first and suppli-
ers then set their final retail prices, taking these fees into account.31 Absent
Broad Retail Price MFN clauses, these suppliers would have the pricing free-
dom to set different retail prices across different retailers. This may seem
slightly counterintuitive in a situation with effective RPM, but it is important
to recall that RPM is intrinsically a vertical arrangement; it does not necessa-
rily involve anything more than an upstream supplier setting a downstream
retail price. There is nothing explicit within RPM that means that the supplier
30 For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether it would be found to be “RPM” under the
relevant competition law. In the European Union, this in turn depends on whether the retailer is
found to be an “agent” of the supplier. See Commission Notice—Guidelines on Vertical Re-
straints ¶ 18, SEC (2010) 411 final (May 10, 2010) [hereinafter European Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints]; see also Bennett, supra note 26.
31 For simplicity, Boik and Corts assume that this fee is a fixed charge per unit, but the general
findings in these models should carry over to situations in which the fee is charged as a commis-
sion set proportional to retail price. Boik & Corts, supra note 20, at n.2; see also Johnson, supra
note 28. Throughout this article, we use the terms “fee” and “commission” interchangeably.
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cannot set different prices across retailers. Moreover, we expect a profit-maxi-
mizing supplier to do exactly this—set different prices across retailers when
those retailers charge the supplier different fees.
The interesting question, however, is what does such supplier pricing free-
dom, or its absence, mean for retailers’ fees? Consider Retailer A’s perspec-
tive. With supplier pricing freedom, Retailer A will set its fees with
consideration for how any increase will raise the retail prices at its stores or
website, and thus reduce its sales. The mechanism underlying this sales effect
is indirect. An increase in Retailer A’s fees will increase the supplier’s costs
of selling through Retailer A, which will lead that supplier to increase the
retail prices it sets for Retailer A. This will make Retailer A relatively less
attractive than its competing retailers who have not increased their fees and
will lead to Retailer A losing sales to competing retailers.
The power of this indirect mechanism to constrain prices will depend on a
number of factors, such as the extent to which suppliers pass through fee
increases as higher retail prices and the extent to which consumers switch
between retailers on the basis of price. In general, however, this mechanism
means that there typically will be at least some competitive constraint on the
fees retailers charge.
What is the impact of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses in this context?
Effectively, these clauses undermine the mechanism outlined above by re-
stricting the extent to which suppliers can price differently across retailers.
With such an MFN clause in place, Retailer A can raise its fee rate to the
supplier knowing that there is no consequent risk of the supplier setting higher
retail prices for Retailer A than for Retailer A’s competitors. This means that
Retailer A will expect to lose far fewer sales as a result of the fee rate in-
crease, and this in turn greatly reduces (or even eliminates) the indirect com-
petitive constraint on Retailer A’s fee rates. As a result, we expect Broad
Retail Price MFN clauses to lead to higher retailer fee rates, and consequently,
higher retail prices.
More formally, within a theoretical model, the inclusion of a Broad Retail
Price MFN clause means that suppliers no longer set prices through each re-
tailer on the basis of that retailer’s fees. Rather, they set prices across retailers
based on average retailer fees. As Boik and Corts note, this produces two
different effects.32 First, as Retailer A’s fees increase, average retailer fees
increase by a lesser amount. For example, in a symmetric two retailer model,
32 Boik & Corts, supra note 20, at 9. These effects would in fact occur even with perfect
competition upstream between suppliers. As such, the existence of vigorous competition up-
stream—as might reasonably be assumed to exist between suppliers to platforms such as Ama-
zon Marketplace—does not in itself imply that we can be sanguine about Broad Retail Price
MFNs.
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average fees will increase by half as much as Retailer A’s own fees. This has
the effect of reducing the supplier’s pass-through rate relative to its own fees.
Thus final retail prices charged through Retailer A increase by less than they
would absent the Broad Retail Price MFN clauses. With a standard downward
sloping demand curve, Retailer A will lose fewer sales due to price increases.
As a result, Retailer A has a greater incentive to raise its fees with a Broad
Retail Price MFN clause because it loses fewer sales by doing so. This result
occurs even where there is no demand interaction (that is, no competition)
between downstream retailers.
Second, as Retailer A raises its fee, average retailer fees increase. Because
the supplier is required under the Broad Retail Price MFN clause to price the
same across retailers, this increase in average retailer fees also increases the
prices the supplier charges through competing retailers. This directly reduces
the competitive constraint faced by Retailer A from competing retailers, again
providing an incentive for Retailer A to set higher fees.
Why would suppliers ever sign off on such clauses? Retailers seem to get
the upside in terms of higher retailer fee rates. This need not be the case
however. Within these models, the suppliers may find Broad Retail Price
MFN clauses to be profitable depending on the parameters used. If lump-sum
transfers are possible, these can also be used by retailers to induce supplier
participation. Moreover, even if suppliers are made worse off by the Broad
Retail Price MFN clauses, they may be willing to accept such clauses to deal
with the retailers in question. This is most likely to be the case when the latter
have significant bargaining power relative to the suppliers, perhaps because
they constitute an important route to market.
B. BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFN CLAUSES CAN RESTRICT ENTRY
AT THE RETAILER LEVEL
The effect of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses on entry is more subtle. Boik
and Corts consider a situation in which an incumbent faces an entrant that is
somewhat less attractive to consumers (their term is “downward-differenti-
ated”).33 For example, customers may be loyal to the existing player or the
entrant may offer more of a “no-frills” service. This is modeled as the entrant
gaining less demand than the incumbent would at comparable prices. The en-
trant may also have lower costs.
Boik and Corts find that the imposition of a Broad Retail Price MFN clause
by an incumbent can deter entry by a potential competitor that is more
strongly downward-differentiated. The Broad Retail Price MFN clause pre-
vents a competitor from offering lower retail prices than the incumbent
33 Id. at 15–19.
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(through offering lower fees to suppliers) to win customers. This exacerbates
the entrant’s demand disadvantage. If the potential competitor’s fixed costs
are sufficiently high, the Broad Retail Price MFN will deter entry that would
have otherwise occurred.
On the other hand, Broad Retail Price MFN clauses can encourage entry by
retailers with less differentiated, higher-cost business models because of their
potential to soften competition and increase retailer profits. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, Boik and Corts also find that, where potential entrants are able to
choose their business model, they will be more likely to choose a higher cost,
less downward-differentiated business model where they face Broad Retail
Price MFNs, thus limiting the extent of competition between business models.
C. IN A MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC BUSINESS FORMATS, BROAD RETAIL
PRICE MFN CLAUSES CAN ELIMINATE PRICE COMPETITION AT
THE RETAIL LEVEL AND REPLICATE RPM
Foros, Kind, and Shaffer provide a further insight into the economics of
Broad Retail Price MFN clauses in a paper inspired by the U.S. e-Books
case.34 Prior to Apple’s entry into the market, Amazon had a strong position in
retailing e-Books. At that time, Amazon employed a standard retail model
whereby it paid upstream publishers a wholesale price for e-Books and then
set retail prices itself. The book publishers were unhappy with Amazon’s po-
sition in retail as well as the low prices at which Amazon had been retailing e-
Books.35 They were therefore pleased when Apple showed an interest in enter-
ing the market.36 When Apple eventually did so, it was with an “agency
model” whereby the upstream publishers, and not Apple, set final retail prices.
34 Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16; United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir.
2015).
35 Apple e-Books, 791 F.3d at 299–300.
[T]op executives in the Big Six [publishers] saw Amazon’s $9.99 pricing strategy as a
threat to their established way of doing business. . . . In the short term . . . Amazon’s
lower-priced ebooks would make it more difficult for them to sell hardcover copies of
new releases. . . . Further down the road, the publishers feared that consumers would
become accustomed to the uniform $9.99 price point for these ebooks, permanently
driving down the price they could charge for print versions of the books. Moreover, if
Amazon became powerful enough, it could demand lower wholesale prices from the
Big Six or allow authors to publish directly with Amazon, cutting out the publishers
entirely.
Id.
36 United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Apple’s requests
for meetings in New York was an exciting turn of events for the Publishers and prompted a flurry
of telephone calls among them. They speculated about how they might turn Apple’s entry into
the e-book business to their advantage in their battle with Amazon.”).
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As discussed above, Apple also imposed a Broad Retail Price MFN clause on
the publishers.37
Foros, Kind, and Shaffer consider the impact of such a Retail Price MFN
within a hypothetical mixed business format situation where publishers sell
through Apple on an agency basis but continue to sell through Amazon on a
wholesale price basis.38 They find that the imposition by Apple of a Broad
Retail Price MFN, if binding, would tend to raise final retail prices to the level
that would be observed with adoption of the agency model across all retailers.
That is, market prices would be set by suppliers as if there were RPM across
all retailers.39 The underlying driver for their finding is that any price reduc-
tion by Amazon would, under the MFN agreement, be immediately and auto-
matically matched by the publishers on Apple’s iBooks platform. The Broad
Retail Price MFN therefore means that Amazon cannot hope to profit by such
a price reduction.
In practice, Amazon switched to an agency model quickly after Apple,
thereby giving up its pricing flexibility. In its recent judgment on the case, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the publishers forced
Amazon’s change of approach.40 Foros, Kind, and Shaffer argue that this need
not have been the case given the existence of the Retail Price MFN. The
combination of agency agreements between the publishers and Apple with a
Broad Retail Price MFN is likely to lead to prices that are no different from
industry-wide RPM, and thus the authors conclude that Amazon would have
had nothing to gain from rejecting the agency model.41 In this case, Amazon
would not have required any forcing by suppliers.
That said, as the Second Circuit emphasized, Broad Retail Price MFN
clauses will also have enhanced the publishers’ incentives to persuade Ama-
zon to adopt the agency model, even if it had not otherwise wished to do so.42
If Amazon had—potentially perversely—reacted to Apple’s entry by vigorous
37 See Apple e-Books, 791 F.3d at 299–311 (providing background on the negotiations that
underpinned the eventual acceptance by the “Big Six” publishers of the agency agreements and
Retail Price MFN clauses).
38 Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 26–28.
39 Id.
40 See Apple e-Books, 791 F.3d at 309 (“The district court found that while Amazon was
‘opposed to adoption of the agency model and did not want to cede pricing authority to the
Publishers,’ it knew that it could not prevail in this position against five of the Big Six.”); see
also id. at 317 (“By the very act of signing a Contract with Apple containing an MFN Clause,
then, each of the Publisher Defendants signaled a clear commitment to move against Amazon,
thereby facilitating their collective action. As the district court explained, the MFNs ‘stiffened
the spines’ of the Publisher Defendants.”).
41 See Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 6 (“[T]he MFN can lead to uniform prices that
resemble the same outcome that would arise under industry-wide adoption, making Amazon’s
decision a moot point[.]”).
42 See Apple e-Books, 791 F.3d at 317.
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price cutting, the Broad Retail Price MFNs would have forced the publishers
to match and thus potentially sell significant volumes below cost. Given that
revenues were apparently intended to be split between the publishers and Ap-
ple on a 70:30 basis, the publishers would have borne the brunt of any contin-
ued price cutting by Amazon.43
III. IMPLICATIONS OF EXISTING RPM LITERATURE AND CASE
LAW FOR BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFNS
While the economic literature on the anticompetitive effects of Broad Retail
Price MFNs is nascent, there is a close relationship between Broad Retail
Price MFN clauses and more standard RPM. There is a wider and more estab-
lished economic literature and body of case law on the competitive effects of
RPM. If reviewed carefully, this wider literature can inform our understanding
of the likely economics of Broad Retail Price MFN clauses.
One important link between Broad Retail Price MFNs and effective RPM is
obvious: the former can only exist in the presence of the latter (i.e., where a
supplier sets retail prices). Our key observation in this article, however, relates
to another link. We note that standard RPM effectively involves two distinct
elements. There is the vertical element, whereby a supplier sets final retail
prices. This is the inherent and explicit element of RPM, and in principle pure
RPM involves only this vertical element. However, in practice, within both
the economic literature and industry practice, RPM typically (if implicitly)
also involves a horizontal element, whereby the supplier sets identical retail
prices across all retailers (or retail platforms).44
The horizontal element of RPM is typically observed in actual RPM cases
and, as we discuss below, it is also an implicit assumption in much of the
economic literature.45 This horizontal element of RPM is in turn closely re-
lated to Broad Retail Price MFN clauses. Consider some of the cases de-
scribed above. In these cases, the RPM that would have existed absent the
As a sophisticated negotiator, Apple was fully aware that its proposed Contracts would
entice a critical mass of publishers only if these publishers perceived an opportunity
collectively to shift Amazon to agency. In fact, this was the very purpose of the MFN,
which Apple’s Saul devised as an elegant alternative to a provision that would have
explicitly required the publishers to adopt an agency model with other retailers. As
Cue put it, the MFN “force[d] the model” from wholesale to agency.
Id.
43 Id. at 303.
44 As noted above, it is important to recall that the horizontal element of RPM discussed here
relates purely to the supplier setting identical prices across its retailers. There is nothing in this
aspect that implies any sort of direct pricing link across different suppliers.
45 In what follows, we simplify slightly by equating the horizontal element of RPM to setting
an identical price across retailers. However, a variant, whereby fixed price relativities are pre-
served across retailers, would have the same effects.
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Broad Retail Price MFN clauses would have been purely vertical, with suppli-
ers having the pricing freedom to set different prices across different retail
platforms.46 A Broad Retail Price MFN clause limits supplier pricing freedom,
and introduces a horizontal element, requiring the supplier to set the same (or
no higher) price to be charged at the retail outlet. That is, in the cases de-
scribed above, the Broad Retail Price MFN clauses ensured that prices were
identical across retail platforms, just as under the horizontal element of RPM.
The close relationship between Broad Retail Price MFNs and the horizontal
element of standard RPM means that we can potentially learn more about the
former from the established economic literature on the latter. Much of this
literature effectively combines both vertical and horizontal elements of RPM,
as does much of the existing case law. The elements are, however, concep-
tually separate. Once separated, the horizontal element emerges as essential to
several of the more serious antitrust concerns. The vertical element is of far
less concern.
Perhaps surprisingly, the economic literature has given limited attention to
the distinction between the vertical and horizontal elements of RPM. In many
cases, the horizontal element is simply assumed without discussion or recog-
nition. The literature on RPM distinguishes three broad groups of anticompe-
titive effects potentially attributable to RPM: (1) downstream effects, (2)
upstream effects, and (3) effects at both levels. We assess the extent to which
the findings in these papers depend on the assumed horizontal element of
RPM for their identified anticompetitive effects. That is, we look at the extent
to which the authors assume that suppliers will not only set prices, but that
suppliers will set the same prices across retailers. We find that in much of the
literature, the horizontal element of RPM is crucial, or at least likely to sub-
stantially exacerbate concerns.
The RPM literature allows us to go beyond the existing but limited scholar-
ship on MFN clauses. Analogizing from the RPM literature, we identify a
number of additional anticompetitive effects that Broad Retail Price MFNs
may produce. Specifically, in addition to the concerns highlighted in the pre-
vious part, they may facilitate downstream collusion, facilitate upstream col-
lusion, act as a commitment device to protect monopoly rents upstream, and
may even restrict entry or expansion upstream.
46 We might expect this to occur if, for example, these retail platform fees charged different
commissions or fees.
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A. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS IDENTIFIED IN THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE
While there is an extensive literature on the economics of RPM, seven key
categories of potential anticompetitive harm emerge:47
(1) RPM may facilitate collusion downstream;
(2) RPM may restrict entry or expansion downstream;
(3) RPM may soften competition downstream;
(4) RPM may facilitate collusion upstream;
(5) RPM may restrict entry or expansion upstream;
(6) RPM may act as a commitment device to protect monopoly rents up-
stream; and
(7) RPM may soften or eliminate competition both upstream and
downstream.
The first three relate primarily to competition at the downstream level, the
next three relate primarily to competition at the upstream level, and the final
one relates to competition more generally across the system, both upstream
and downstream. We group them in this way in the discussion below.
1. Anticompetitive Effects of RPM at the Downstream Level
There are three potential anticompetitive effects of RPM at the downstream
level: (1) to facilitate collusion downstream, (2) to restrict downstream entry,
and (3) to soften downstream competition. Where these effects provide the
anticompetitive rationale for the RPM, we expect to observe retailers instigat-
ing it rather than suppliers, as the former typically stand to gain more from the
anticompetitive effect. We find that the horizontal element of RPM is crucial
for the first two categories of anticompetitive effect, but not the third.
a. RPM to Facilitate Collusion Downstream
RPM agreements can be a powerful means to achieve indirect downstream
collusion. Retailers can delegate to common suppliers the roles of setting col-
47 Matthew Bennett, Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti & David Stallibrass, Resale
Price Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced
Policy, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1278 (2010) (summarizing several categories of potential com-
petitive harm related to RPM agreements). The remaining type—RPM to restrict entry up-
stream—was first identified in Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of
Resale Price Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363 (1985). However, the idea has only recently
been developed further and modeled. See John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers’
Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 672 (2014). The
economic literature in this area continues to develop. While the discussion below reflects current
understanding, additional anticompetitive effects of RPM may be identified in the future.
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lusive prices, monitoring adherence to these prices, and even punishing cheat-
ing. This theory of harm does not appear to have been modeled formally,
perhaps because it is too obvious. However, it is well recognized in the litera-
ture.48 Any such collusion is likely to be of particular concern for antitrust
authorities. While the vertical element of RPM is clearly required, it is the
horizontal element of RPM that drives the collusive outcome. If suppliers re-
tained flexibility to set different retail prices for different retailers, it is far
from clear that the retailers would be capable of colluding.
b. RPM to Restrict Entry or Expansion Downstream
RPM may benefit downstream incumbent firms by making it harder for
entrants or smaller rivals to steal business by undercutting them, thereby re-
stricting their ability to gain share in the market. For example, RPM could
potentially restrict the growth of new business models, such as no frills
bricks-and-mortar outlets or low-cost Internet retailers, if the entrants must
charge the same price as incumbent retailers. This theory of harm also does
not appear to have been modeled formally. It is, however, well recognized as
a theory of harm and highlighted as a key concern arising from RPM in the
European Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.49 The horizontal ele-
ment of RPM is clearly crucial for this effect.
c. RPM to Soften Competition Downstream
Greg Shaffer shows that RPM may increase prices when retailers have
buyer power.50 His model assumes two differentiated retailers, each with lim-
ited shelf space. There is perfect competition between manufacturers, which
compete to get their products onto these shelves. Absent RPM, manufacturers
would compete on wholesale price to get onto the shelves, which drives down
48 See generally THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, RE-
SALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 13 (1983) (early
discussion of existing literature). This potential anticompetitive effect is also set out in the Euro-
pean Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints:
[B]y eliminating intra-brand price competition, RPM may also facilitate collusion be-
tween the buyers, i.e., at the distribution level. Strong or well organized distributors
may be able to force/convince one or more suppliers to fix their resale price above the
competitive level and thereby help them to reach or stabilise a collusive equilibrium.
European Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 30, ¶ 224.
49 RPM may reduce dynamism and innovation at the distribution level. By preventing
price competition between different distributors, RPM may prevent more efficient re-
tailers from entering the market and/or acquiring sufficient scale with low prices. It
also may prevent or hinder the entry and expansion of distribution formats based on
low prices, such as price discounters.
Id. This effect is also very similar to the entry restriction story described above for Retail Price
MFNs by Boik and Corts, supra note 20, which also requires pricing equality across retailers.
50 Greg Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facili-
tating Practices, 22 RAND J. ECON. 120 (1991).
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wholesale prices. Competition in the downstream market means that retailers
pass the lower wholesale prices on to consumers.
With RPM, retailers allocate shelf space to the manufacturers that offer
them the highest total profits, taking wholesale and retail prices into account.
Shaffer shows no overall effect if RPM is adopted by both retailers. If just one
retailer adopts RPM, however, it works as a commitment device for that re-
tailer not to compete by lowering prices in response to the pricing of the other
retailer. Overall, prices rise.51
This is an interesting finding in the current context, as it specifically relates
to the vertical element of RPM. Indeed, the result disappears if there is a
horizontal element to the RPM. However, the model relates to fairly specific
circumstances, and no case appears to have raised antitrust concerns of this
sort to date.
2. Anticompetitive Effects of RPM at the Upstream Level
There are three potential anticompetitive effects of RPM at the upstream
level: (1) to facilitate collusion, (2) to restrict entry or expansion, and (3) to
act as a commitment device to protect monopoly rents upstream. Where the
anticompetitive effects of RPM are primarily upstream, and where these ef-
fects provide the anticompetitive rationale for the RPM, we expect to observe
upstream firms, rather than retailers, instigating RPM. In the first two catego-
ries, the vertical element of RPM drives the effect, but the horizontal element
also plays an important role. In the third category, the horizontal element is
crucial for the anticompetitive effect.
a. RPM to Facilitate Collusion Upstream
For collusion between firms to be stable, deviations from the collusive
agreement must be observed and punished. Otherwise, each firm will have an
incentive to cheat on the agreement. Consider a situation in which upstream
firms wish to collude. If these upstream firms negotiate contracts with retail-
ers privately, they are not able to observe each other’s wholesale prices di-
rectly. Since changes in retail prices are typically imperfect signals of changes
in wholesale prices, it may be hard to spot deviations from a collusive agree-
ment. Thus collusion is more difficult to sustain.
Bruno Jullien and Patrick Rey show that upstream firms can use RPM to
facilitate upstream collusion since it brings the publicly observable element of
51 Foros, Kind, and Shaffer find similar results in a variant of this model, in which there are
several manufacturers, each using its own dedicated retailer network. In this model, prices will
be higher if a subset of retailers adopts RPM, but not if they all do. Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle
Kind & Greg Shaffer, Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Indus-
try-Wide Adoption, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 179, 183 (2011).
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price—the final retail price—under the control of the upstream firms.52 This
makes it easier for the upstream firms to detect deviations from the collusive
agreement. For simplicity, their paper assumes that the likelihood of detecting
deviations rises to 100 percent under RPM. This improved detection rate
makes collusion substantially easier to sustain.
However, Jullien and Rey also assume identical retailers and prices across
retailers. As such, their paper implicitly incorporates both the vertical and
horizontal elements of RPM. This raises the question of whether their result
would still hold absent the horizontal element (i.e., if suppliers had the pricing
freedom to set different retail prices across different retailers).
In our view, the probability of detection is unlikely to be 100 percent in
such a situation since it is typically harder to detect deviations from a variety
of retailer-specific prices than on a single marketwide price.53 This does not
mean that the effect identified by Jullien and Rey would not exist without the
horizontal element of RPM. If upstream firms are intent on colluding, they
can always choose to set uniform prices across the market to facilitate this
strategy. It does highlight, however, that RPM can have two distinct effects on
the ease of detecting deviations from a collusive agreement, and therefore on
the ability to sustain such an agreement. The vertical element of RPM—the
fact that upstream firms control retail prices—can help. However, we might
expect the horizontal element of RPM—whereby the supplier sets identical
prices across retailers—to significantly strengthen this effect. Thus, overall
we would still expect the horizontal element of RPM to facilitate upstream
collusion.
b. RPM to Restrict Entry or Expansion Upstream
A second theory of competitive injury that has gained attention recently is
that RPM may restrict entry or expansion by upstream rivals. As shown by
John Asker and Heski Bar-Isaac, RPM allows incumbent manufacturers with
market power to align retailer incentives with their own to deter entry or ex-
pansion by smaller rivals.54 So long as they can preserve their market position,
incumbent manufacturers have supernormal profit that they share with retail-
ers by setting retail and wholesale prices to give retailers a supernormal mar-
gin. If, however, a retailer decides to stock a rival product and thereby
52 Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion, 38 RAND J. ECON
983 (2007).
53 There may be another reason why it is harder for upstream firms to collude in these circum-
stances. Where optimal collusion would entail different prices across retailers, this would likely
require far more extensive contacts between upstream firms, which in turn involves running
greater antitrust risk.
54 See Asker & Bar-Isaac, supra note 47.
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facilitates the expansion of that rival, the manufacturer’s profits will be re-
duced, which will be reflected in a lower retail margin.
Asker and Bar-Isaac assume, for simplicity, that all retailers are identical
and charge the same price. Thus, the horizontal element of RPM is implicit to
their model. In our view, however, it is probable that the horizontal element of
RPM would be required for this result, even in a more sophisticated model. It
is important for the result that all retailers have incentives to exclude entry,
and it is not obvious that it would be possible to ensure that each retailer had
supernormal profit if prices were set differently in different retailers. Thus, it
seems unlikely that purely vertical RPM would have this anticompetitive
effect.
c. RPM as a Commitment Device to Protect Monopoly Rents Upstream
RPM may address a well-known monopoly commitment problem, origi-
nally identified by Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole and first considered in relation
to RPM by Daniel P. O’Brien and Greg Shaffer.55 In the O’Brien and Shaffer
model, a monopoly supplier sells to a number of differentiated downstream
retailers. The first retailer is willing to pay more for the product if it does not
face any competition. However, the upstream monopolist cannot credibly
commit to this because, ex post, supplying a second retailer would be profita-
ble at the margin. This reduces the payment that the first retailer is willing to
make. The overall effect is that, absent a commitment device, the upstream
firm is unable to extract the full rent associated with its market power because
it is unable to commit to not cutting prices on later contracts.
O’Brien and Shaffer show that RPM can solve this problem by allowing the
upstream firm to commit to the monopoly price and extract its full monopoly
rents. Patrick Rey and Thibaud Verge´ find the same result under different
conditions.56 Here, it is specifically the horizontal element of RPM that drives
the effect, at least in the case of minimum RPM. As O’Brien and Shaffer
highlight, the effect relies upon minimum RPM, implying uniform prices
across retailers. If suppliers were able to set prices at different levels across
retailers (as would be feasible under the purely vertical element of RPM) then
the monopoly commitment problem would not be solved.
55 Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PA-
PERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990); Daniel P. O’Brien & Greg Shaffer,
Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 23 RAND J. ECON. 299 (1992).
56 Patrick Rey & Thibaud Verge´, Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts, 35 RAND J.
ECON. 728 (2004).
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The result is confirmed using different modeling assumptions in a recent
paper by Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen and Bjørn Olav Johansen.57 Their paper
assumes that retailers gain to some extent from their own sales effort. In this
model, there is no harm associated with purely bilateral vertical RPM agree-
ments, but customer harm arises when the RPM has a horizontal element.
3. RPM to Soften or Eliminate Competition Both
Upstream and Downstream
Three models consider the effects of RPM at both the upstream and down-
stream levels. In contrast with the majority of papers described above, these
models rely purely on the vertical element of RPM for their findings of anti-
competitive effect. However, it is also worth noting that at least two of the
three models have somewhat ambiguous effects, with RPM potentially having
a positive effect.
Paul Dobson and Michael Waterson show that, in a bargaining framework,
RPM can reduce retailers’ incentives to negotiate wholesale prices by restrict-
ing downstream competition.58 When retailers are able to price freely, their
success within a competitive downstream market depends heavily on the
wholesale prices they face. Lower wholesale prices allow them to win busi-
ness from their retail competitors by passing on (to a greater or lesser extent)
any reduction in wholesale prices in the form of lower retail prices. This com-
petitive dynamic provides retailers with a strong incentive to bargain hard on
wholesale prices.
RPM upsets this process. If retailers cannot set their own retail prices they
have less ability to win new business by achieving lower wholesale prices.
This reduces their incentives to bargain on wholesale prices, which softens
competition at the upstream level. The overall result is higher wholesale
prices and higher retail prices to the detriment of consumers. However, RPM
has ambiguous implications in this model. As might be expected, the anticom-
57 Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Bjørn Olav Johansen, Resale Price Maintenance with Secret
Contracts and Retail Service Externalities, AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS (forthcoming) (Aug.
5, 2015 pre-publication version available at www.nipe.eeg.uminho.pt/Uploads/Semin%C3%A1
rio%202015/Secret%20RPM%2005-08-2015.pdf).
58 Paul P. Dobson & Michael Waterson, The Competition Effects of Industry-Wide Vertical
Price Fixing in Bilateral Oligopoly, 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 935, 935–62 (2007). Shaffer finds
similar results, albeit in a somewhat different modeling framework. See GREG SHAFFER, OFFICE
OF FAIR TRADING, ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF RPM (RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE) AGREE-
MENTS IN FRAGMENTED MARKETS 34–42 (2013), webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402
142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/RPM.pdf. Shaffer extends the model of
O’Brien and Shaffer to a multi-supplier context and allows for a more even distribution of bar-
gaining power between upstream firms. See O’Brien & Shaffer, supra note 55. Unlike Dobson
and Waterson, supra, Shaffer’s extended model allows for non-linear wholesale contracts (that
is, there can be a fixed fee payment as well as a wholesale price). It also assumes that each
retailer deals with just one upstream firm.
2016] BROAD RETAIL PRICE MFN CLAUSES 87
petitive effect of RPM is strongest where retailers have most of the bargaining
power and would, absent RPM, compete vigorously in the retail market. If, by
contrast, suppliers have most of the bargaining power and are relatively differ-
entiated, this effect is reduced and RPM may even lower prices.59
Foros, Kind, and Shaffer derive a similar result in a context where retailers
receive a share of the retail price rather than paying a wholesale price per
unit.60 They find that RPM tends to raise prices if there is less substitution
between upstream suppliers than there is between downstream retailers, but
that it otherwise lowers prices. The authors explain that “[t]ransferring control
of retail pricing to the level where the degree of competition is lower brings
prices closer to the ones that maximize industry profit.”61 This result is driven
entirely by the vertical element of RPM.62
Finally, Patrick Rey and Thibaud Verge´ show that RPM can soften, and
potentially eliminate, effective competition—at the interbrand level between
suppliers as well as at the intrabrand level between retailers—if used jointly
with franchise fees.63 This model is based on a system of “common agency”
whereby the products of all upstream suppliers are stocked by all downstream
retailers. This model again does not require that each supplier set the same
prices across all of its retailers. However, and unlike the other models dis-
cussed in this subpart, all the bargaining power is assumed to sit with the
manufacturers, which make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the retailers.
While the assumption of manufacturers’ bargaining power is not crucial for
the findings in the Rey and Verge´ model,64 it should be noted that the model
has multiple equilibria, some of which may be more competitive than the
situation absent RPM. Where upstream firms have all the bargaining power, it
is not unreasonable to assume that they would opt for the monopoly equilib-
rium, under which all competition is eliminated. However, given that up-
stream and downstream firms may have differing preferences over these
various possible equilibria, it becomes more ambiguous which (if any) equi-
librium would emerge if downstream firms were to have some bargaining
power. Certainly, we may not observe the monopoly equilibrium in this
circumstance.
59 In this model the positive effect derives from the role of RPM in removing an element of
double marginalization. As such, maximum RPM may also achieve a positive effect without the
need for minimum RPM.
60 Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 14.
61 Id. at 14.
62 This ambiguity result is arguably stronger than that in the Dobson and Waterson model
because the positive effect cannot simply be achieved through maximum RPM.
63 Patrick Rey & Thibaud Verge´, Resale Price Maintenance and Interlocking Relationships,
58 J. INDUS. ECON. 928 (2010).
64 See SHAFFER, supra note 58, at 105.
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B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE
Table 1 below summarizes the key results from the literature reviewed
above. It reveals that the horizontal element of RPM drives anticompetitive
harm in most cases and, in particular, in those relating to the more serious
concerns of collusion and foreclosure. The purely vertical element of RPM is,
in itself, far less likely to be harmful, and thus does not constitute RPM at its
worst.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE:
THE ROLE OF THE HORIZONTAL ELEMENT OF RPM
Horizontal Element of Horizontal Element of
Anticompetitive Effect RPM Assumed? RPM Required?
RPM to facilitate Yes Yes
collusion downstream
RPM to restrict entry or Yes Yes
expansion downstream
RPM to soften No No
competition downstream
RPM to facilitate Yes Yes
collusion upstream
RPM to restrict entry or Yes Probably
expansion upstream
RPM as a commitment Yes Yes
device to protect
monopoly rents
upstream
RPM to soften or No—but competitive No—but competitive
eliminate competition effects are ambiguous effects are ambiguous
both upstream and (at least with retailer (at least with retailer
downstream bargaining power) bargaining power)
This analysis informs that of Broad Retail Price MFNs due to their close
relationship with the horizontal element of RPM. The nascent literature on
Broad Retail Price MFNs already addresses their potential to (1) soften com-
petition on retailer commissions, (2) restrict entry into downstream retail, and
(3) eliminate downstream retailer competition. The RPM literature, and in
particular that based upon the horizontal aspect of RPM, supports these early
findings, but suggests further areas of concern. Specifically, it indicates that
Broad Retail Price MFNs may (4) facilitate collusion downstream, (5) facili-
tate collusion upstream, and (6) act as a commitment device to protect monop-
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oly rents upstream. They may potentially also (7) act to restrict entry or
expansion upstream.
C. THE HORIZONTAL ELEMENT OF RPM IN UK CASE LAW
The existing case law on RPM also ignores the distinction between the
vertical and horizontal elements of RPM. Yet decisions typically rely on an
implicit assumption that the RPM at issue incorporates both elements. Indeed,
many (if not all) RPM cases involve evidence of one or more retailers com-
plaining to their supplier when they observe other retailers undercutting their
prices.
Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass analyze the likely theory of
harm in three UK RPM cases.65 First, they review the OFT’s case against
RPM in the UK book market. From 1901 until 1997, the Net Book Agreement
(NBA) allowed publishers to set the retail prices of books. Any retailer that
deviated from the agreement could be refused a future supply of books. The
agreement was dropped in the face of investigation by the OFT. Giovannetti
and Stallibrass draw on earlier work by Catherine Ball, Stephen Davies, Mat-
thew Olczak, and Christopher Wilson, which reviews the consequences of
removing RPM from this market. This work finds that removing the NBA
allowed the development of new low-price business models, such as sales of
books through supermarkets and the Internet, expanding availability and
range, and probably also total book sales.66 On the basis of this finding, Gi-
ovannetti and Stallibrass conclude that the key anticompetitive effect of the
NBA was restricting downstream entry of new business models. The horizon-
tal element of RPM was key to this effect.
Second, Giovannetti and Stallibrass examine the OFT’s Hasbro/Argos/Lit-
tlewoods case from 2003.67 The OFT found that Hasbro, one of the largest
toys and games suppliers in the United Kingdom, had entered into vertical
agreements with Argos and Littlewoods, the two largest catalog-based retail
chains, to fix the price of certain Hasbro toys and games at the recommended
retail price. Prior to these agreements, there had been very strong competition
between Argos and Littlewoods, which also had substantial buyer power vis-
65 See Emanuele Giovannetti & David Stallibrass, Three Cases in Search of a Theory: Resale
Price Maintenance in the UK, 2009 EUR. COMPETITION J. 641. Because RPM is an infringement
of EU and UK competition law by object, the OFT is not required to provide any analysis of
likely anticompetitive effects within its work. Giovannetti and Stallibrass therefore review the
facts of the cases rather than any legal conclusions of the OFT in order to identify the likely
occurring harm.
66 CATHERINE BALL, STEPHEN DAVIES, MATTHEW OLCZAK & CHRISTOPHER WILSON, OFFICE
OF FAIR TRADING, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT UPON PRODUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS 8–11 (2008).
67 Argos Ltd & Littlewoods Ltd v. OFT, [2014] CAT 24 (U.K. Competition Appeal Trib.).
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a`-vis Hasbro because they were collectively its primary distribution channel.
This case seems to have been a clear case of RPM facilitating downstream
collusion, and indeed the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, when reviewing
the OFT’s decision on appeal, stated that a finding of horizontal tripartite
concerted practice (effectively, horizontal collusion facilitated through a third
party) would also have been sustainable based on the facts of the case.68 The
horizontal element of RPM was intrinsic to this finding.
Third, Giovannetti and Stallibrass review the OFT’s 2003 case on replica
football kits (soccer uniforms). Umbro, a manufacturer of replica football kits,
had agreements with downstream retailers to fix the price of England,
Manchester United, Chelsea, and Nottingham Forest replica kits at the same
retail price. The decision found that the network of agreements constituted a
horizontal concerted practice between the retailers, a theory that was endorsed
and expanded by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (and the Court of Ap-
peal). The decision did not, however, include any clear theory of harm. Gi-
ovannetti and Stallibrass suggest four alternative explanations. They speculate
that it might have been difficult for the OFT to identify which theory of harm
it was most likely to prove on the basis of the evidence provided. What seems
clear, however, is that the horizontal element of RPM would have been crucial
for any of them.
As these cases elucidate, the horizontal element of RPM plays a very im-
portant role in antitrust cases. The problem is not usually that the supplier sets
downstream prices, or even that it sets downstream prices across a variety of
different retailers, but rather that it sets these downstream prices at the same
level across retailers.
D. AN ANALOGY FROM THE U.S. E-BOOKS CASE
The UK RPM cases described above involve RPM with both vertical and
horizontal elements. The U.S. e-Books case is different in that each RPM
agreement between the publishers and Apple was purely vertical. The associ-
ated Broad Retail Price MFN provided the horizontal element. In that context,
it is interesting to review the most recent e-Books decision69 to see which
elements of the harm are caused by the vertical RPM and which by the hori-
zontal Retail Price MFN.
While it is in practice difficult to separate these effects, the judgment seems
to conclude that vertical RPM helped publishers collude to set higher prices
for e-Books sold through Apple. However, the horizontal MFN was crucial
because it provided publishers with the incentive to force Amazon into the
68 Id. ¶ 790.
69 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
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RPM agreement too, thus reducing Amazon’s ability to compete against Ap-
ple. One might infer from the judgment that, absent the horizontal MFN, the
purely vertical RPM arrangement between the publishers and Apple may well
have had a more limited anticompetitive effect.
IV. EFFICIENCY BENEFITS AND PROCOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS OF RPM
Above we focused on the potential anticompetitive effects of RPM. As
shown, it is the horizontal element often associated with RPM that is crucial
for many of the more anticompetitive effects of RPM—not the vertical ele-
ment intrinsic to pure RPM. This is true both in theory and in actual antitrust
cases.
As the economic literature makes clear, however, RPM may also have a
number of efficiency benefits and procompetitive effects. In this part, we
highlight that, while many of the most well recognized of these benefits also
depend on the horizontal element of RPM, there is an important set of addi-
tional potential benefits that can arise from the purely vertical element of
RPM.
A. EFFICIENCY BENEFITS AND THE HORIZONTAL ELEMENT OF RPM
We do not endeavor here to provide a comprehensive description of all the
potential efficiency benefits of RPM. Instead, we focus on the most well
recognized:
(1) RPM reduces free riding at the retail level on such aspects as service
provision.70
(2) RPM maintains retailers’ margins to ensure the existence of a network
of retailers that are willing to stock and promote products.71
(3) RPM maintains retailers’ incentives to provide quality certification,
which in turn promotes interbrand competition.72
As with the economic literature on anticompetitive effects of RPM, the pa-
pers underlying the potential efficiency benefits outlined above effectively as-
70 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
86 (1960).
71 See, e.g., Raymond Deneckere, Howard P. Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty,
Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, 111 Q.J. ECON. 885 (1996). This can in turn facili-
tate product entry: guaranteeing that future retailers will charge the same as “pioneer” retailers
can facilitate initial entry of a good. See Martin K. Perry & Robert Porter, Can Resale Price
Maintenance and Franchise Fees Correct Sub-Optimal Levels of Retail Service?, 8 INT’L J. IN-
DUS. ORG. 115 (1990).
72 See, e.g., Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality
Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).
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sume that RPM comprises both vertical and horizontal elements, although
once again this assumption is not typically made explicit. Given the nature of
the efficiency benefits listed above, this is not surprising. For example, it is
not clear how purely vertical RPM could overcome free-rider problems at the
retail level or protect retailers’ margins; the horizontal element of RPM seems
key. That is, these benefits are not only driven by the supplier setting retail
prices, but also by its setting them at the same level across different retailers.
Given that Retail Price MFNs work in a very similar way to the horizontal
element of RPM, we might therefore expect some of the potential efficiency
benefits to be relevant in the case of Retail Price MFNs. It is noteworthy that,
in the investigation into private motor insurance, the CMA considered
whether Retail Price MFNs might be justified by free-rider effects.73 The
CMA was even sympathetic to this argument for Narrow Retail Price MFNs.74
The free-rider concern here is that, absent a Retail Price MFN, insurers would
be able to win new customers for their own vertically integrated sites by list-
ing on the PCW and then encouraging customers to switch back to their own
site to make the sale. Free riding on the PCW’s investment in winning cus-
tomers could lessen that PCW’s incentives to invest going forward to the det-
riment of suppliers, PCWs, and customers.75 The CMA also considered
whether free-rider concerns might justify Broad Retail Price MFNs. However,
it concluded that significant incremental benefits beyond those from Narrow
Retail Price MFNs were not likely, while Broad Retail Price MFNs substan-
tially increased the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.
73 See COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTH., PRIVATE MOTOR INSURANCE MARKET INVESTIGA-
TION: FINAL REPORT 169–74 (Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter CMA, PRIVATE MOTOR INSURANCE
REPORT].
74 The CMA considered that there could be ways other than the Narrow Retail Price MFN to
overcome free-riding concerns. However, it did not need to reach a final conclusion on whether
these alternatives were realistic because it did not find the narrow retail price MFNs to have a
significant anticompetitive effect. The CMA also considered the free-riding argument in respect
of the incremental need for Broad Retail Price MFNs (over and above narrow ones), but did not
find it persuasive in that case. The potential for platforms to use Broad Retail Price MFNs to
ameliorate free-rider problems has been modeled more formally in a paper by Chengsi Wang and
Julian Wright. See Chengsi Wang & Julian Wright, Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price
Coherence (June 10, 2015) (unpublished), www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2015_pa1_p1.pdf.
75 The CMA also considered a second potential efficiency benefit arising from Retail Price
MFNs. This related to their role in preserving the “credibility” of the PCWs as truly representing
the prices available in the market. The concern was that if consumers did not have confidence
that PCWs were comparing a truly representative set of prices, then consumers might stop using
them altogether, leading to increased search costs for consumers, reduced searches, and higher
prices overall. A survey carried out for the CMA investigation found that a quarter of those who
have bought insurance through a PCW stated that the “accuracy” of the prices was a key factor.
The CMA concluded that Narrow Retail Price MFNs were a legitimate tool used by PCWs to
engender consumer trust in their service offering. They did not, however, consider Broad Retail
Price MFNs to provide sufficient incremental benefit in terms of such credibility to justify their
use. See CMA, PRIVATE MOTOR INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 73, at 166–76.
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B. EFFICIENCY BENEFITS, PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS, AND THE
PURELY VERTICAL ELEMENT OF RPM
While the efficiency benefits discussed above rely on the horizontal ele-
ment of RPM, there are a number of less commonly discussed, and even
novel, potential efficiency benefits and procompetitive effects that arise from
the purely vertical element of RPM.76
1. Benefits from RPM If Upstream Competition Is More Vigorous than
Downstream. As discussed above, Foros, Kind, and Shaffer find that RPM
tends to reduce prices if competition upstream is more vigorous than down-
stream. It puts price setting in the hands of the actors that have the greatest
incentives to compete aggressively.77
This may be highly relevant in the case of online retail platforms, and espe-
cially PCWs, which are specifically designed to facilitate shopping around,
thus driving vigorous upstream competition. By contrast, consumers may do
relatively less shopping around between online retail platforms and PCWs
than they do using them, perhaps assuming that prices will not vary substan-
tially between them.78 Some consumers may even equate such platforms with
advertising that provides a useful window on the “true prices” set by suppli-
ers, which they expect to be identical everywhere.79
76 The reduction or elimination of double marginalization is often cited as an efficiency bene-
fit of RPM. While it is true that this benefit only requires the vertical element of RPM, it is also
important to note that the elimination of double marginalization can be achieved through maxi-
mum RPM, which is not generally viewed as a concern by economists, and which is not a focus
in this article. There is no incremental benefit from fixed or minimum RPM in reducing double
marginalization. See MICHAEL A. SALINGER & ALEXANDER ELBITTAR, WHITE PAPER ON VERTI-
CAL RESTRAINTS 12 (REG’L COMPETITION CTR. FOR LATIN AM. 2013) (discussing the roles of
maximum and minimum RPM).
77 Foros, Kind & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 14.
78 We are not aware of empirical research into consumers’ perceptions of the relative prices on
Internet retail platforms and PCWs, but there is some evidence that consumers do shop around
between (as opposed to within) such platforms, albeit not on a large scale. For example, a con-
sumer survey carried out by IFF Research on behalf of the UK Competition Commission in the
context of its now completed private motor insurance market investigation found that 24% of
consumers check two or more PCWs before purchase, and that this figure rose to 46% amongst
17 to 34 year olds. See COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTH., PRIVATE MOTOR INSURANCE MARKET
INVESTIGATION, CUSTOMER SURVEY TABLES 6 (2013), assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/
5329dee940f0b60a760002be/130816_customer_survey_tables.pdf.
79 Johnson provides an additional argument for why it may be better for upstream suppliers to
set prices when there is limited downstream competition due to customer switching costs across
retail platforms. Under a standard retail model, retail platforms will seek to exploit customer
switching costs by offering low initial prices to win customers and then subsequently raising
prices once they are “locked in.” This raises overall retail mark-ups and creates consumer harm.
By contrast, under an agency model, suppliers compete directly on an ongoing basis, and there is
no harm from consumer lock-in. Justin P. Johnson, The Agency and Wholesale Models in Elec-
tronic Content Markets (Mar. 15, 2013) (unpublished), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2126808. In our view, however, this is a special case of the more general double-marginal-
ization argument. Just as in the general case, it seems to us that the benefit identified by Johnson
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2. Benefits from Enhanced Upstream Competition Through Increased Plat-
form Participation. It could be argued that competition is, on balance, in-
creased by RPM. Participation on platforms increases the degree of
competition between suppliers because consumer search becomes easier, but
suppliers may not be willing to participate in such platforms absent price pro-
tection through RPM. Thus, RPM may enhance competition between suppli-
ers by providing an incentive for their increased platform participation. This
effect is especially likely where suppliers have alternative routes to market on
which they have full control over prices (e.g., their own websites). We are not
aware of any academic papers that model this platform participation effect,
but we expect the supplier participation decision to be at least partly driven by
how many extra customers it feels it would gain access to through participat-
ing in the platform.80
3. Benefits from RPM Where Upstream Firms Have Better Information on
Demand or Marketing Strategy. Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright examine the
relative benefits of an online platform being a reseller (which sets prices it-
self) versus a marketplace (suppliers set prices) in a context where suppliers
and resellers may both have private information about the optimal level of
marketing for each product.81 They find that the marketplace approach (which
is equivalent to vertical RPM) should be preferred when upstream suppliers
have more private information. The reselling approach should be preferred
when downstream retailers have the greater degree of private information.
While their paper looks at the effect of private information on marketing strat-
egy, the same argument could apply to private information about product de-
mand, which affects optimal pricing.82 This may explain why traders on
could be achieved through maximum RPM only. There would seem to be no additional benefit to
be gained from fixed for minimum RPM.
80 In the context of its investigation into private motor insurance, the CMA has considered the
linked question of how insurers optimize their choice of sales channels. See, e.g., CMA, PRIVATE
MOTOR INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 73, at A8(1)-1 to A8(1)-42.
81 Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Marketplace or Reseller?, 61 MGMT. SCI. 184 (2015).
82 There is an analogy here to category management, which involves a retailer allowing a
given upstream firm to choose the price range and shelf positioning for a particular category of
product within the store. While there is recognition that category management can be anticompe-
titive, there are also a number of efficiency rationales for it, which have led antitrust authorities
to take a relatively hands-off approach thus far. One such rationale is that the upstream firm
knows more than the individual retailer about customer demand for the product, not least because
it sees sales across retailers. This can lead the upstream supplier to set prices more efficiently.
See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Category Management: Conwood v. United States
Tobacco Co., 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 311, 318 (2009). We are not aware of any papers that
explicitly model this point. The key existing papers on delegation of price setting under asym-
metric information about demand make the contrary assumption that retailers know more about
demand than suppliers. See Esther Gal-Or, Optimal Franchising in Oligopolistic Markets with
Uncertain Demand, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 343 (1991); Tatsuhiko Nariu & Dongjoon Lee, Re-
sale Price Maintenance Versus Delegation, Under Asymmetric Information, 81 MANCHESTER
SCH. 401 (2013). However, the informed-supplier theory in the category management literature
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Amazon Marketplace, rather than Amazon Marketplace itself, set retail prices.
Amazon Marketplace is not in a good position to set such prices for the myr-
iad limited-demand products that are sold on its platform. The benefits of
suppliers controlling prices directly may also be substantial where the optimal
pricing structure is relatively complex, as with the yield management pricing
used in the airline sector, for instance.
The strength of the efficiencies identified above derive from the purely ver-
tical element of RPM. They also depend on the facts of the specific market.
However, these efficiencies may be powerful arguments for vertical-only
RPM in certain cases.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS
This article highlights that many of the potential anticompetitive effects and
efficiency benefits of Broad Retail Price MFNs can be identified by examin-
ing the literature on RPM, given the close relationship between the former and
the implicit horizontal element of the latter. In this part, we take the same
approach to considering policy implications. That is, we consider the appro-
priate policy for Broad Retail Price MFNs by reference to the existing policy
on RPM.83
There is in fact an ongoing policy debate about the appropriate legal treat-
ment of RPM itself. In the United States, RPM was a per se violation until the
Leegin case.84 While the rule of reason now applies to RPM in the federal
courts, many still believe that there should be a strong presumption that RPM
is harmful, and indeed a substantial number of U.S. states have legislated
against it.85
In Europe, the Commission has resisted calls to alter its policy on RPM,
which continues to be a hardcore restriction under Article 101 TFEU, or a
restriction of competition “by object.” This essentially means it can be pre-
sumed harmful without the authority needing to demonstrate any anticompeti-
tive effect. The burden of proof is on the alleged infringers to demonstrate that
the RPM has efficiency benefits that satisfy the conditions for exemption
appears plausible, and fits with the conclusions about private information on optimal marketing
levels in Hagiu and Wright. Hagiu & Wright, supra note 81.
83 In contrast with RPM, there is currently no general guidance from competition authorities
on how Broad Retail Price MFN clauses should be viewed under the law. Indeed, such clauses
are not considered explicitly at all within the otherwise highly comprehensive European Com-
mission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. European Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra
note 30.
84 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
85 See Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2014), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/lindsay_chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
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under Article 101(3) TFEU.86 While the European Commission’s Guidelines
do not state it explicitly, the current EU policy stance on RPM appears to be
based on the view that many of the efficiency benefits of RPM can be
achieved through other vertical restraints that are less likely than RPM to
harm competition. That is, RPM is not indispensable for achieving such
benefits.87
However, good policy design balances likely anticompetitive and procom-
petitive effects.88 It is noteworthy that the policy debate on RPM has not dis-
tinguished between the explicit vertical and implicit horizontal elements of
RPM in considering this balance. Table 2 below addresses this gap by sum-
marizing the findings above in relation to the relative pros and cons of the
vertical and horizontal elements of RPM separately.
Many of the more serious anticompetitive effects attributed to RPM in the
literature and case law depend on the horizontal element of RPM. The most
recognized efficiency benefits of RPM require the horizontal element, too, but
these may be achievable through other less restrictive vertical restraints. By
contrast, the vertical element of RPM is unlikely to produce substantial anti-
competitive concerns and may—on its own—give rise to some additional and
potentially significant efficiency benefits. It is less obvious that these latter
benefits could be achieved using other vertical restraints.
Table 2 shows that the overall effects of the horizontal element of RPM are
either equal to or worse than those of RPM as a whole. In other words, RPM
that has a horizontal element is RPM at its worst.89 Given this finding, it may
86 In their 2011 paper on RPM, Matthew Bennett, Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti,
and David Stallibrass find that the ideal policy approach to RPM is likely to lie somewhere
between these two extremes, noting that cases might most usefully be prioritized where the likely
anticompetitive effects of RPM are most likely to outweigh its potential efficiency benefits. This
in turn occurs when there is significant market power upstream, significant buyer power down-
stream, or a network of RPM agreements covering a substantial share of the market. See Bennett
et al., supra note 47, at 1297–98.
87 European Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 30, ¶ 109 (“There is a large mea-
sure of substitutability between the different vertical restraints. This means that the same ineffi-
ciency problem can be solved by different vertical restraints. . . . This is important as the negative
effects on competition may differ between the various vertical restraints. This plays a role when
indispensability is discussed under Article 101(3).”).
88 See Bennett et al., supra note 47, at 1282–87 (discussing how economics can inform an
appropriate policy line between “presumed legality” and “presumed illegality” for potentially
anticompetitive restrictions such as RPM).
89 More formally, while it is not possible to weigh the positive and negative effects of the
different elements of RPM in a fully mathematical way, the overall impact of RPM equates to the
procompetitive effects minus the anticompetitive effects. This is set out in the equation below,
but replacing N with N*, where the latter represents the efficiency benefits for which RPM is
indispensable (i.e., effects that cannot effectively and efficiently be achieved through other less
restrictive vertical restraints):
Overall impact of RPM = (M + N*) – (K + L) or, by rewriting slightly, (M – K) + (N* – L).
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TABLE 2
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RPM
Vertical plus
Vertical Element Horizontal
of RPM Only Elements of RPM
K: L:
Anticompetitive Effects Substantial harm A wide-ranging set of
relatively unlikely potentially serious
anticompetitive effects
M: N:
Procompetitive Effects Untested but potentially Well-understood
and Efficiency Benefits significant benefits benefits, but may be
achievable through
other vertical restraints
seem reasonable to treat the purely vertical element of RPM more leniently
than the standard form, which has a horizontal element. However, it can be
difficult in practice to identify whether a specific instance of RPM incorpo-
rates a horizontal element. As such, there may be merit in treating all forms of
RPM the same under the law. Nevertheless, we advocate that authorities
should be more willing to allow RPM when it only has a vertical element.
Under EU law, this would involve an individual exemption under Article
101(3).
Our focus in this article, however, is the appropriate policy towards Broad
Retail Price MFNs, given that they are closely analogous to the horizontal
element of RPM, or RPM at its worst.90 On the basis of the table above, it
seems that Broad Retail Price MFNs are no less likely than RPM to produce
anticompetitive effects that exceed the procompetitive benefits.
The negative policy presumption around RPM in the European Union and in many U.S. states
suggests that this overall equation is negative. However, the impact of the vertical element of
RPM alone (i.e., M – K) is unlikely to be significantly negative given the discussion above. As
such, the incremental impact of the horizontal element of RPM (i.e., N* – L), in a situation
where there is already vertical RPM, appears to drive the expectation that RPM will have a
negative impact overall. That is, this horizontal element represents RPM at its worst.
90 An additional argument potentially supports this finding. As is highlighted in Bennett et al.,
many of the more significant anticompetitive effects arise when retailers have buyer power and
especially if retailers instigate the RPM. See Bennett et al., supra note 47, at 1297. Retailers
typically institute Retail Price MFNs, which is another reason to view them as mimicking the
worst of RPM.
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VII. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
The appropriate policy line for RPM is beyond the scope of this article. Our
aim instead is to provide a comparative analysis of RPM and Broad Retail
Price MFNs to ensure policy coherence between the two forms of restriction.
Our analysis shows that a consistent legal approach would not treat Broad
Retail Price MFNs any more leniently than RPM. In Europe, this means that
Broad Retail Price MFNs should constitute hardcore restrictions, or restric-
tions of competition by object.
This conclusion is important because inconsistent policy across comparable
types of restrictions can lead to flawed and arguably distortionary competition
decisions. The OFT’s commitments decision in the Hotel Online Booking
case demonstrates this.91 This case was run as an RPM case, the core identi-
fied concern being that hotels set prices and that platforms were unable to
offer discounts. However, the case was initiated and motivated by a new en-
trant platform, Skoosh, which was primarily concerned about the horizontal
Broad Retail Price MFN clauses, not the vertical RPM. These MFN clauses
were imposed as standard terms by the incumbent platforms, and prevented
hotels from setting their prices any lower through Skoosh than through these
incumbents.
Why did the UK competition authorities pursue the case under an RPM
theory instead of going after the MFN clause directly? Once convinced that a
case has economic merit, competition authorities will typically employ a for-
mat that is most likely to succeed, often on the quickest timescale. The fact
that RPM is a hardcore restriction in Europe, whereas Broad Retail Price
MFN clauses are not, meant that the OFT could have expected a quicker and
more successful outcome through focusing on the RPM element of the behav-
ior. Doing so, however, may have distorted the enforcement approach, not
least because the purely vertical element of the RPM may not in itself have
been especially problematic from an economics perspective.
In conclusion, we consider that it would be helpful to have greater policy
clarity on the likely treatment of Broad Retail Price MFNs by antitrust author-
ities. In developing such policy, we would also urge antitrust authorities to
bear in mind the parallels between Broad Retail Price MFNs and the horizon-
tal element of RPM. On this basis, we argue that Broad Retail Price MFNs
should not be treated any less leniently under the law than is RPM.
91 Office of Fair Trading, Hotel Online Booking: Decision to Accept Commitments to Re-
move Certain Discounting Restrictions for Online Travel Agents (Jan. 31, 2014).
